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The 113th Congress extended the research and development (R&D) tax credit
through the end of 2014 by passing the Tax Increase Prevention Act (H.R.
5771), which President Obama signed into law on December 19, 2014.
That the fate of this credit in 2015 remains unknown is
not surprising. Since its inception in 1981, it has expired
eight times, been extended 16 times, and been modified
on several occasions. In recent years, the R&D tax credit
was mixed into a package with other one-off tax breaks
such as equipment deductions for small businesses and
specific Medicare reimbursements, all of which expired
on a regular basis and prompted political debates over
their extensions. Such “tax extenders,” as they are sometimes called, can create an impression that the discrete
provisions within the package are all minor pieces of
legislation. But that impression does no justice to the
real economic significance of the R&D tax credit.
In fiscal year 2012, U.S. firms received R&D tax
credits totaling $11.1 billion, or about 8 percent of the
estimated $140.9 billion spent by federal agencies on
defense and non-defense R&D that year.1 IRS data
from 2008 further reveal that firms in the manufacturing sector accounted for nearly 70 percent of total
credits claimed, with the computer and electronic products, chemical, and transportation equipment industries
benefitting the most.2

SUMMARY
• This brief explores the history, logistics, and policy implications
of the temporary R&D tax credit, and offers recommendations
for additional research that would help determine the merit of
making the credit permanent.
• Using new, restricted-access IRS data and an instrumental
variables strategy, the brief offers an unbiased estimation of
the effectiveness of the R&D tax credit, showing that corporate
research intensity—the ratio of R&D spending to sales—is indeed
highly sensitive to the tax subsidy rate. When it gets cheaper for
firms to spend on qualified R&D, they actually do spend more,
as policymakers hope.
• Going forward, it would be helpful to know if the credit would be
even more effective in a permanent regime, where companies
could make long-term research plans with confidence. Further
research also is needed to see whether the R&D tax credit leads
to greater economic growth than would have been possible absent
the credit, as well as whether this credit is functioning merely
to reward firms for investing in research they would have done
anyway. But keeping the R&D credit as a temporary “tax extender”
seems imprudent, given its effectiveness.
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Given the importance of technological advances in stimulating longterm economic growth, the level of
R&D spending in the United States
rightfully commands the attention
of industry leaders, policymakers and
researchers. The R&D credit, also
known as the research and experimentation (R&E) credit, rewards
ﬁrms that increase their research
spending with a tax credit worth up
to 20 percent of their expenditures
above a determined, firm-specific base
amount. According to the GAO, large
corporations have dominated the use
of this credit, and two-thirds of large
companies surveyed in 2015 stated
that they utilize the federal R&D
credit.3, 4
Aside from the United States’
direct and indirect efforts to support R&D generally through federal
agencies and grants, federal tax law
offers two incentives for private R&D:
a deduction for qualiﬁed research
spending under Section 174 of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and a
non-refundable tax credit for qualiﬁed
research spending above a base
amount under IRC Section 41. These
two tax advantages reduce the aftertax price of R&D investment and
jointly are referred to as the “R&D tax
credit” in this brief. It is their com-

bined effect on the after-tax price of,
and impact on, R&D spending that
I assess here. This brief explores the
history and logistics of the R&D tax
credit, sheds new light on its effectiveness, and considers recent legislative
reform proposals and the policy issues
that continue to challenge the current iteration of the credit. Given the
effectiveness of the “temporary” tax
credit in spurring R&D spending, the
brief also offers recommendations for
additional research that would help
determine the merit of making the
credit permanent.

Congress first adopted a tax credit for
R&D expenditures as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in
order to stanch the decline in private
R&D which took hold in the early
1970’s. Intentionally designed to be
temporary so as to reduce its impact
on the federal budget, the credit was
the first of its kind. It allowed ﬁrms
to earn a tax credit on spending they
already were able to expense under
the existing Section 174 expensing
provision.5
Seeking to incentivize corporations to invest in new R&D that
may or may not have had a practical

application for their own businesses,
the original credit rewarded qualified research expenditures (QREs) in
excess of what the ﬁrm would have
spent in the absence of the credit by
lowering the after-tax cost of qualified
research. The economic rationale for
this tax break was that private R&D
spending creates spillover effects that
benefit society at large but cannot be
captured entirely by the firm doing
the spending, despite the abundance
of intellectual property protections
available in the U.S. Further, subsidizing marginal R&D expenditures
may afford U.S. firms a competitive
advantage in global markets.
The credit deﬁned a ﬁrm’s base
level of R&D spending and granted a
tax credit equal to a fraction of spending above that base level. Originally,
the credit was equal to 25 percent of
QREs above the base amount. The
base was defined as the firm’s average qualiﬁed R&D spending in the
previous three years or 50 percent
of current spending, whichever was
greater. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
later reduced the statutory credit rate
from 25 to 20 percent.
Because a ﬁrm’s base was originally a moving average of its past
spending, adding qualiﬁed research
spending in any given year would

Improved,” GAO-10-136, November 6, 2009. http://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-10-136
4 Summary of the BDO USA LLP 2015 Survey of 100 tax directors of large public companies available at http://blogs.
wsj.com/cfo/2015/04/09/rd-tax-credits-lead-investmentdecisions-survey/. Reference: BDO.
5 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 later required ﬁrms to reduce their Section 174 deduction by the
entire amount of research credits claimed.
6 Congressional Research Service (CRS). “Research Tax

Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th Congress,” March 13, 2015. http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL31181.pdf.
7 CRS.
8 For a detailed account of the specifics of each requirement
and how they have changed over time, see CRS.
9 U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Issues Final
Regulations Clarifying Research and Experimentation
Expenditure Rules for Businesses,” Press Release, July
23, 2014. http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/

HOW THE CREDIT WORKS

NOTES
Office of Management and Budget. “Analytical Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2014,” 2013.
2 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy. “Investing in U.S. Competitiveness: The Benefits of Enhancing
the Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit,”
March 25, 2011. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Investing-in-US-Competitiveness-Benefits-of-RandE-Tax-Credit-3-2011.pdf
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). “The Research Tax Credit’s Design and Administration Can Be
1
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increase the ﬁrm’s base by one-third of
the increase in each of the subsequent
three years, essentially tempering the
continued use of the credit, as the tax
credit was only given for a percentage
above the base. This provision created dynamic disincentives for current
qualiﬁed R&D spending, leading
to negative marginal credit rates for
some ﬁrms and lower than statutory rates for many others. To fix this
issue, in 1989, Congress established a
new formula for the base as the ﬁrm’s
average gross receipts in the previous
four tax years multiplied by the ﬁrm’s
“ﬁxed-base percentage,” a measure
of historic research intensity, or 50
percent of current qualiﬁed spending, whichever was greater. The ﬁrm’s
ﬁxed-base percentage was defined as
and remains its ratio of total qualiﬁed
R&D expenditures to total gross
receipts between 1984 and 1988,
subject to a 16 percent ceiling. Startups and ﬁrms lacking gross receipts or
QREs for the years between 1984 and
1988 were assigned a three percent
ﬁxed-base percentage.
Since its inception, the traditional
credit’s incentive effect has varied
widely among firms, in part due to
the 1984-1988 fixed-base percentage
and also due to the requirement that
the base amount for the credit not

be less than 50 percent of current tax
year QREs, in order to receive the 20
percent statutory rate. In other words,
when current QREs exceed twice the
historically deﬁned base, the redeﬁned
base is increased 50 cents for each
additional dollar of R&D spending.
Overall, 3.5 to 9.5 percent of ﬁrms (5
to 16 percent of ﬁrms earning a credit)
between 1981 and 1990 had marginal
credit rates equal to the statutory rate,
depending on the year. In some cases,
circumstances around credit incentives
have led established firms to invest
less in R&D as a share of revenues.6

THE CURRENT SYSTEM

struggle to qualify for the traditional
R&D tax credit despite the traditional
credit’s start-up provisions. Currently
the ASC provides a credit equal to
14 percent of current year QREs
that exceed 50 percent of the average QREs for the three preceding tax
years. In the beginning of 2009, the
ASC replaced the Alternative Incremental Research Credit (AIRC) election, which was available to firms that
could not claim the traditional credit
from 1996 through 2008. The traditional research credit and the ASC are
mutually exclusive, and the choice of
which to claim comes down to QREs.
THE QRE ISSUE

The R&D tax credit that expired at
the end of 2014 consisted of four
components: the traditional research
credit that has been discussed above,
an alternative simplified credit (ASC),
the university basic research credit
for fostering collaboration with U.S.
higher education institutions, and
the energy research credit. The latter
two could be claimed in conjunction
with one of the former two if a firm
qualified.7
The ASC, a research tax credit
that ﬁrms can permanently opt for in
lieu of the traditional research credit,
was introduced in 2007 for ﬁrms that

Under IRC rules, qualified research
expenditures have had to satisfy four
loosely defined requirements. Qualifying activities must be “experimental;”
the sought-after knowledge must be
“technological in nature;” and the
research must be aimed at developing
a “new business component.” Lastly,
this component must have “a new or
improved function, performance or
reliability or quality.” In other words,
detailing or aesthetically tweaking
current products or processes does not
qualify. Upon first glance, a reasonable
person might disagree with another
reasonable person about what does

BDO.
The IV strategy directly addresses the simultaneity of R&D
spending and marginal credit rates.
15 Rao, Nirupama. “Do Tax Credits Stimulate R&D Spending? The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit in its First Decade,”
Forthcoming, 2015. http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/
publications/RD032014.pdf.
16 GAO.
17 For more information, see the joint report from the Treasury
Department and White House entitled “The President’s

Framework for Business Tax Reform” from February 2012.
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-TaxReform-02-22-2012.pdf.
18 Hall, B. H., and J. Van Reenen. “How Effective are Fiscal
Incentives for R&D? A Review of the Evidence,” Research
Policy, 29, 449–469. 2000.
19 Treasury, 2011.
20 Treasury, 2015.
21 GAO.

NOTES
final-regulations-rande.aspx.
Internal Revenue Code, Section 41 Credit for Increasing
Research Activities. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/
research_credit_basic_sec41.pdf.
11 U.S. Department of the Treasury. “General Explanations of
the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals,”
February 2015. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.
pdf.
12 CRS.
10

13
14
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and does not qualify as a QRE, and
disputes between industry, the IRS,
and Treasury have persisted since the
introduction of the tax credit.8
In the fall of 2013, the Treasury
Department broadened the ability
of firms to claim QREs by allowing
them access to the credit for a new
product, even when they are able to
sell the product to their customers
directly and benefit early and often
from their own research. The final
regulations were issued in the summer
of 2014 and specified that “subsequent
actions taken by the taxpayer’s trade
or business with the product have
no effect on the eligibility of R&E
expenditures for a tax deduction if the
expenditures are otherwise qualifying R&E expenditures.”9 Notably,
these rules are retroactive, so firms can
accrue tax benefits for previous years,
and they will be implemented without
a mandate to estimate the budgetary
impact for which they will be responsible—potential lost revenue included.
So which expenditures count as
qualified and which do not? Eligible
QREs include wages for in-house
R&D; supplies, like prototypes and
testing materials; contract research;
and basic research payments to qualified non-profit organizations. According to the Treasury Department,
approximately 70 percent of QREs
are labor costs. Excluded research
expenditures for the purposes of IRC
Section 41 are adaptations of existing business components for specific
customers; studies related to market
research, data collection, and quality control; software for internal use
only; research conducted outside the
U.S.; and all research related to the
social sciences, arts, or humanities.10

These lists are not comprehensive, but
do illustrate the complex system that
firms must navigate before calculating
the portion of their total R&D spending that may qualify for the research
credit.
This complexity is especially
problematic, as it creates compliance
challenges for firms and enforcement
challenges for the IRS, as companies
claiming the credit automatically trigger audit flags.11 Concerned about the
legitimacy of late or amended claims
for the credit, the IRS decided to
designate “research credit claims” as a
tier 1 compliance issue in 2007, opening the approval of these credits up to
subjective judgments and interpretations.12 At the same time, it’s possible
that some firms that are eligible for the
tax credit don’t take advantage of it.
These compliance challenges and
information barriers can carry serious
economic implications. Among companies planning to expand into new
U.S. markets within the next three
years, three-quarters listed tax credits,
exemptions and reductions as having
the greatest impact on that decision,
in a 2015 survey. Of the 35 percent
of companies that did not use R&D
credits, a majority thought they could
not qualify for it.13 This belief can be
consequential, for as detailed in my
research, described below, there has
been a clear and significant increase
in R&D spending among those firms
that have claimed the tax credit.

A NEW UNDERSTANDING
OF THE CREDIT’S
EFFECTIVENESS
In my recent paper, I use new,
restricted access IRS data and an
4

instrumental variables (IV ) strategy14
to determine an unbiased estimation
of the effectiveness of the R&D tax
credit and whether it actually increases
corporate research spending as
intended.15 I focus on the years 1981
through 1991—the last year prior
to the credit’s ﬁrst lapse in 1992—
because tax policy changes that were
common in the credit’s early years and
critical to the identification strategy
have been absent more recently. The
IRS data is necessary to accurately
measure firms’ marginal credit rates,
which are diffcult to infer from annual
R&D spending as reported in public ﬁnancial ﬁlings. R&D expenses
reported publicly in 10-k filings and
compiled in Compustat conform to
a broader deﬁnition of R&D that
includes both R&D conducted abroad
and domestic research expenditures
that do not qualify for the R&D tax
credit because they fail to meet QRE
criteria. If ﬁrms respond to changes in
subsidies for qualiﬁed R&D by rearranging their shares of qualiﬁed and
non-qualiﬁed spending, there is little
way of identifying such movements
through public data alone. Because
a ﬁrm’s credit rate is determined by
its relative QREs, changes in the
composition of spending can affect
credit rates. In comparing tax subsidy
measures constructed from previously
studied public ﬁnancial data to tax
subsidy measures constructed using
IRS data, I find that they differ widely
and that the differences vary from year
to year, suggesting that the public data
could lead to biased elasticity estimates of the effect of the tax credit on
firm spending.
The IRS statement of income
(SOI) data are drawn from a panel
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sample of corporate tax returns (Form
1120), with items relating to R&D
spending pulled from Form 6765.
Among other details, the data report
annual QREs, base amounts, tentative
R&D tax credits, and limitations due
to insuficient tax liabilities. Because
the IRS SOI data include both public
and private ﬁrms and do not oversample large ﬁrms, only a small set of
ﬁrms appear in both the Compustat
and IRS SOI data. In general, the
Compustat data suggest that more
ﬁrms—from 2.7 to nearly 22 percent,
depending on the year—qualify for an
R&D tax credit than actually do (see
Figure 1).
Despite the improved accuracy
of the IRS data, firms typically only
report the details of research spending in years when they apply for the
R&D tax credit. If, for example, a firm
has insufficient income tax liabilities
and does not apply for a credit, its
qualiﬁed spending is unknown, and
missing values appear as zeros on the
SOI, likely understating R&D spending. Additionally, IRS SOI data only
report QREs and do not provide any
sense of how a ﬁrm’s non-qualiﬁed
spending responds to subsidies for
qualiﬁed spending. Shifting or relabeling expenses as QREs may be
occurring behind the scenes, but this
lack of information limits any analysis.

FINDINGS
My estimates of the price elasticity
for R&D expenditures imply that
corporate research intensity—the
ratio of R&D spending to sales—is
highly sensitive to the tax subsidy rate.
Short-run elasticity estimates exceed
one, meaning that a 10 percent reduc-

tion in the cost of R&D leads the
average firm to increase its research
intensity by more than 10 percent. In
other words, when it gets cheaper to
spend on qualified R&D, firms actually do spend more, as policymakers
hope. Analysis shows that wages and
supplies account for the bulk of the
increase in research spending. In the
long-run, R&D expenditures increase
even more over time, but firms do

But there are some important
caveats regarding broader interpretations of this analysis. For example,
research decisions made by firms over
thirty years ago may not represent
current spending by industry, size,
domicile, etc. Also, my analysis does
not assess the impact of ﬁrms’ expectations of future R&D tax credits
on research spending. During its
ﬁrst decade, the credit was always

FIGURE 1: SAMPLE OF SAME FIRMS CLAIMING THE R&D TAX CREDIT
BY DATA SOURCE
100%

Compustat Data
(Publicly Available)

80%

IRS SOI Data
(Restricted Access)

60%
40%
20%
0%

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

not time their research spending to
maximize their R&D tax credits. This
perhaps reflects uncertainty about the
continued existence of the credit. In
a dynamic analysis, I find that small
and young ﬁrms appear more responsive and their short-run response is
stronger, suggesting that they may face
lower adjustment costs or liquidity
constraints in ﬁnancing R&D. Elasticities of qualiﬁed and total (qualiﬁed
and non-qualiﬁed) research intensities
from a smaller sample of firms suggest
that they do respond to changes in the
user cost largely by increasing their
qualiﬁed spending, meaning that the
type of R&D which the federal credit
deems qualiﬁed research is, in fact, an
important margin on which the credit
affects ﬁrm behavior.
5

1988

1989

1990

1991

renewed before it expired. Since then,
the credit has been allowed to lapse
several times, most of the time being
reinstated retroactively. On one occasion in 1995, however, the credit was
simply allowed to expire for a year.
In the present, less predictable ﬁscal
environment, estimates from an era
of greater certainty may not be fully
applicable.
Looking beyond my own findings, other research on the tax credit
has proven insightful in recent years.
The GAO determined that in 2005
the credit reduced the after-tax price
of additional qualified research by
an estimated 6.4 to 7.3 percent. The
range here is due to assumptions
about discount rates and the length of
any delay in using the tax credit—an
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important point, given the GAO’s
discovery that 44 percent of total net
credits earned in 2005 could not be
used immediately. Since the R&D tax
credit is a component of the General Business Credit (since the 1986
legislation), these unused credits are
subject to a yearly cap and can be carried back one year or carried forward
twenty years. Even more noteworthy,
the GAO identified disparities in
the incentives provided to different firms. Some received no credit
while others were eligible for credits

up to 13 percent of their marginal
R&D spending.16 Furthermore, their
analysis found that a significant portion of credits were earned for spending that firms would have done even
without the tax advantage and were
not used to support the kinds of new
research with spillover effects originally intended by the legislation. A
major part of the problem, the GAO
concluded, was the traditional credit’s
1980’s fixed-base percentage.
Also, a study commissioned by the
Obama administration concluded in

2012 that each dollar of foregone tax
revenue from the credit causes firms
to invest at least a dollar in R&D. The
administration relied on estimates
from the Treasury Department which
indicate that the elasticity for research
spending is around -1, meaning that
the research credit produces a dollarfor dollar-increase in research spending.17 Other scholarly research finds
even larger effects.18 There is general
agreement in the research that the tax
credit increases qualified R&D investments made by firms.

FIGURE 2: RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO EXTEND AND/OR MODIFY THE R&D TAX CREDIT
S. 2260

H.R. 4438 and H.R. 4

H.R. 880

FY2016 Budget
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Through 2015

Permanent (Modified)

Permanent (Modified)

Through 2015

Extension
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Same as H.R. 4438

Traditional Credit

credit can be applied

current tax year QREs

and H.R. 4

to the corporate AMT

above a base amount		

ASC credit rate

		

Repealed after 2015

(base = 50% of the

Also, full amount of

increased from 14% to

Up to $250,000 of the

previous three tax

the credit can be

18% and allowed to

credit can be applied

year’s average annual

applied to the

offset AMT liability

to current tax year payroll

QREs), plus similar

corporate AMT for

taxes when income tax

statutory changes to the

eligible small firms

liabilities are insufficient

university and energy

		

research credits

Changes to Credit for

Equal to 10% of current

Same as H.R. 4438 and

Firms with Insufficient		

tax year QREs (and

H.R. 4

QRE History		

university research payments)		

N/A

Eliminate the reduced
ASC rate of 6% for businesses
without QREs in previous three

years
		

If less than three years		

		

of QREs/payments

Status

Both Passed by House (2014)

Passed by Senate

Finance Committee (2014)		
			

Introduced to House

Requested by

Ways and Means

President (2015)

Committee (2015)

Sorces https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2260
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4438
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr88
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As private sector companies continue
to lobby for a permanent tax credit,
which would eliminate the uncertainty in calculating the after-tax cost
of R&D investments, future research
that assesses how policy certainty
affects research credit responses
would be useful to policymakers, as
they decide whether a longer-term
commitment to the research credit is
worth the budgetary cost.
There is little reason to believe
that the firm’s ratio of research spending to gross receipts from nearly three
decades ago, when multiplied by its
average gross receipts over the prior
four years, is an appropriate base for
firms.19 Indeed, policymakers themselves acknowledge this, as is evident
from recent legislation proposed in
both houses of Congress (see Figure
2). There are several reasons why the
credit has not already been made
permanent, but lost revenue seems to
be the main culprit, at least from a
political perspective.
In response to the modifications
to the R&D tax credit requested in
President Obama’s fiscal year 2016
budget proposal, the Treasury Department projected that repealing the traditional credit and making permanent

the ASC with an increased statutory
rate of 18 percent would cost the federal government $127.7 billion over
the next decade.20 However, traditional budget models do not measure
the dynamic effects of legislation, so
determining the second order effects
of extending the credit would provide
a more accurate projection of the cost
of permanence, beyond the simple
static effect to the Treasury’s coffers.
Though the GAO suggests that
adding a minimum base to the ASC
and eliminating the traditional credit
may solve the incentive issue detailed
above21, enhancing the ASC could
leave more ﬁrms with negative credit
rates in some years in the way that
the traditional credit did before the
1989 base reformulation. Given the
high and robust elasticities estimated
in my research, any policy shift that
would lead to lower credit rates could
substantially reduce corporate research
spending. Redirecting tax expenditures away from the traditional credit
and toward the ASC therefore should
be considered carefully.

CONCLUSION
The “temporary” R&D tax credit is
effective at spurring research spending, as my recent findings show.

7

Going forward, it would be helpful to
know if the credit would be effective
in a permanent regime where companies can make long-term research
plans with confidence. Understanding
exactly why qualified expenditures
appear to be so much more responsive
than broader definitions of R&D—
that is, whether firms are re-allocating
research expenditures from nonqualified to qualified, or are simply
re-labeling research spending—would
also be useful in designing a permanent research credit. Without these
latter insights, an accurate determination cannot be made about whether
the R&D tax credit leads to greater
economic growth than would have
been possible absent the credit, nor
can we conclude definitively whether
or not this credit is functioning
merely as a windfall for a select few
companies and rewarding them for
investing in research they would have
done anyway. Continuing to lump
this credit in with “tax extenders” and
subjecting it to frequent, short-term
renewal debates seems imprudent for
such an effective tool. The consideration of permanency as proposed in
much of the recent legislation appears
warranted.
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